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I. INTRODUCTION  
As digital technology continues to grow, the business of music, that is, 
the traditional recording industry dominated by the major labels, is under 
increased pressure and on the verge of collapse.
1
  Throughout the 20th cen-
tury, record labels controlled consumer access to music by providing artists 
the necessary capital to make recording and distribution a viable option, in 
ever-changing mediums.
2
  In essence, record labels turned music into a 
business by recording what was previously only available to a live audi-
  
 *  J.D., University of New Hampshire School of Law, 2012. 
 1. The music industry – From major to minor, BUSINESS & FINANCE, THE ECONOMIST, (Jan. 10, 
2008), http://www.economist.com/node/10498664. 
 2. David Byrne, David Byrne’s Survival Strategies for Emerging Artists – and Megastars, WIRED 
MAGAZINE, (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/magazine/16-
01/ff_byrne?currentPage=all.  See generally Shuman Ghosemajumder, et al., Digital Music Distribu-
tion, DIGITAL BUSINESS STRATEGY PROFESSIONAL SEMINAR, Mass. Inst. Tech. Sloan School of Man-
agement (2002) (discussing the history of recorded music from the gramophone to MP3 technology). 
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While that business is now struggling in the Digital Age, the music in-
dustry itself is prospering as niche music markets continue to sprout, and 
unique genres appeal to growing, new audiences.
4
  Prior to the advent of 
the traditional industry, characterized by CD-based distribution, music was 
only available through live performances, and audiences were unable to 
bring that experience into their homes.  Over time, major labels brought 
music into consumers’ homes through various mediums, with the tradition-
al industry relying on CDs.  Today, the industry is shifting away from that 
traditional model as modern consumers share, purchase, and discover new 
music instantly through the Internet, rather than CDs.  In this Digital Age, 
more independent artists are able to thrive because of decreased market-




This article will address the impact the shift from hard-copy recordings 
to digital music distribution has had on the recording industry.  Specifical-
ly, it will apply F.B.T. Productions v. Aftermath Records,
6
 which correctly 
held that a label’s relationship with third-party-digital-music-providers is 
that of licensor-licensee, to the modern music industry.
7
  Based on this 
holding, record labels need to reconsider their relationships with artists, 
and create new business models that rely on licensing music, rather than 
the traditional sale-based distribution model. 
The decision in Aftermath will lead to increased royalties for artists in 
the Digital Age.  This article will analyze the impact of that decision for 
the modern music industry by advocating for increased artist royalties in 
this digital music era.  By examining other relevant case law, the funda-
mental purpose of royalty distributions, and the evolution of the recording 
industry, this article will emphasize the need for the recording industry to 
adapt to the changing musical landscape and suggest possible business 
models.  
  
 3. Byrne, supra note 2.  
 4. See Mike Stanzione, The Effects of MySpace on the Music Industry, COLD CLASS 
COMMUNICATIONS, (2010), http://coldclasscommunications.blogspot.com/2010/02/effects-of-myspace-
on-music-industry.html; Byrne, supra note 2.  
 5. Byrne, supra note 2.  
 6. 621 F.3d 958, 961 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 7. Id. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Traditional Record Industry: A Brief Overview 
Throughout the 20th century, the recording industry has adapted to 
multiple technological innovations, changing the manner and medium 
through which it marketed and sold recorded music.
8
  For example, cas-
sette tapes and “8 tracks” competed with vinyl records and turntables until, 
eventually, the CD (Compact Disc) became the preferred medium among 
consumers and dominated the marketplace by the late 1980s.
9
  Similarly, 
the industry has dealt with consumers’ widely available access to radio 
broadcasts, working to ensure that consumers purchase music rather than 
simply rely on free radio.
10
 
When CDs became the primary distribution method, labels changed 
their business models, requiring high-volume sales to maximize profits.
11
  
Prior to the ‘80s, record companies grew talents locally by promoting 
across varied markets through discos, retailers, disc jockeys, and the Na-
tional Top 40, while catering to divergent musical preferences in many 
genres.
12
  As CDs became the predominant medium for distribution, high-
volume sales were necessary to offset the costs of finding, promoting, and 
developing talent.
13
  Thus, labels shifted from localized promotion across 
multiple genres to simply selling CDs and growing revenues around few, 
superstar artists.
14
  Essentially, labels needed assurance that CDs would be 
sold and that their investments would be repaid.  Therefore, rather than 
risking a failed investment by funding a “flop” artist in a niche genre, la-
bels focused their resources on popular artists who were certain to sell 
high-volumes. 
As the disco-era came to a close and record sales floundered in the late 
‘70s, the industry was revitalized by mega-hit artists, like Madonna and 
Michael Jackson, who made their “pop” music debuts in the 1980s.15  
When the “pop” music business exploded during the 1980s, record labels, 
in an effort to lower corporate risk and increase profit predictability, sup-
  
 8. Ghosemajumder et al., supra note 2, at 1–2. 
 9. Id. at 2. 
 10. Stan J. Liebowitz, The Elusive Symbiosis: The Impact of Radio On The Record Industry, 1(1) 
REV. OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 93, 94 (2004). 
 11. See Wolfgang Spahr, Heavy Revenue: Change to Money-Based Tabulation Method Helps Ger-
man Chart Rock Harder, BILLBOARD, Aug. 11, 2007, at 19 (discussing a change in music sales meas-
urement to increase profitability). 
 12. Ghosemajumder et al., supra note 2, at 2–3. 
 13. Byrne, supra note 2.  
 14. Id.  
 15. The Eighties Club, The Politics and Pop Culture of the 1980s, http://eightiesclub.tripod.com 
/id207.htm.  
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pressed the marketplace by controlling supply and clustering fans around 
these star performers.
16
  The model had become: create a megahit-artist and 
watch profits from platinum CD sales soar.
17
  By the mid 1990s, the indus-
try experienced record-high sales, seeing the largest percentage gain in 
revenue in seventy-four years.
18
 
Prior to MP3 technology, the recording industry was extremely com-
plicated, relying on many players to create a successful artist and generate 
profits.
19
  Historically, only the top fifteen percent of the music industry 
has been profitable, while the other eighty-five percent operated at a loss, 
largely due to high market-entry costs.
20
  Consequently, major record com-
panies dominated the industry while independent labels and artists found it 
difficult to enter the market successfully.
21
  As a result, artists relied on 
major music companies, like Sony, Warner Brothers, and Universal, to 
fund their recording sessions, manufacture, market, and distribute their 
CDs, and pay the high costs associated with touring.
22
 
B.  The Development of MP3 Technology 
The Nielsen SoundScan, the predominant music-sales tracking system, 
projected that digital album purchases would surpass those of physical CDs 
in 2011.
23
  Through the first six months of 2010, digital sales accounted for 
27.4% of total music purchasing, an increase of 21.5% from the same mark 
in 2009.
24
  As digital purchases are projected to reach $17 billion by 2014, 
the business of making and selling music is still viable; however, “major” 
labels will need to establish new methods by which they generate revenue 




After its initial development in the late 1980s, the MP3 has grown in 
popularity, making it easier for consumers to share, discover, and listen to 
  
 16. Ghosemajumder et al., supra note 2, at 2–3. 
 17. Byrne, supra note 2. 
 18. Ghosemajumder et al., supra note 2, at 3. 
 19. Pedro Ferreira, et al., Impact of MP3 on the Music Industry, MANIAC TOOLS.COM, 
http://www.maniactools.com/articles/impact-of-mp3-on-the-music-industry.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 
2010).  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Byrne, supra note 2 (discussing artist reliance on major labels for the costs discussed above as 
well as needing labels’ economic resources to ensure the longevity of artists’ careers); Ferreira, supra 
note 1. 
 23. Digital sales gains over physical in 2011, THE INDEPENDENT, (July 8, 2010), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/music/digital-sales-gains-over-physical-in-2011-
2021704.html.  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
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new music—both legally and illegally.26  Over the last decade, the MP3 
has increasingly become the preferred medium among consumers, as CD 
sales have decreased approximately thirteen percent from their peak in 
2002.
27
  Similarly, the Internet and digital downloads, via stores such as 




C.  Impact of the MP3 on the Traditional Industry 
The transition to CD-based distribution required higher sales volumes 
and forced the industry to restructure its approach to artist development in 
order to satisfy its volume quotas.  The industry shifted from developing 
talent in a wide range of musical styles to investing heavily in individual 
artists and creating demand for a particular artist, from a particular genre.  
Under the traditional model, with labels investing large sums in individual 
artists, the cost of producing, selling, and promoting a CD was high, lead-
ing to the megahit-artist model of the 1980s. 
Under the traditional industry, volume pressures and costs associated 
with artist development led to the royalty-based artist compensation meth-
od that still dominates today.  After investing in an artist, labels needed 
assurance that their costs would be repaid, even if the artist failed to attain 
widespread popularity; thus, the royalty system was developed to pay art-
ists incrementally, insuring that labels would recover their costs first and 
foremost, before artists were ever paid. 
The traditional justification for artists receiving smaller royalties, ra-
ther than larger percentages for their work, was that labels were investing 
substantial sums, often upwards of $400 thousand, in potentially unsuc-
cessful acts and needed to recover their investments.
29
  In the traditional 
industry, labels had to balance the high costs associated with distributing 
CDs, such as manufacturing, printing, and shipping.
30
  Consequently, la-
  
 26. Ghosemajumder et. al, supra note 2 at 3–4.  See generally The Recording Industry Association 
of America, 2008 Consumer Profile, www.riaa.com.   
 27. The Recording Industry Association of America, 2008 Consumer Profile, www.riaa.com. 
 28. Id. (finding an approximate fourteen percent decrease in purchases from “record store[s]” and an 
almost fifty percent decrease in purchases from “other store[s]” from their height in 2004); see also The 
Nielsen Company, A Big Music Year for Jackson, Boyle, Swift, Digital Downloads . . . and Vinyl?, 
NIELSONWIRE, (Jan. 7, 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/a-big-music-year-for-
jackson-boyle-swift-digital-downloads-and-vinyl/ (citing 2009 music purchases up 2.1% over 2008 
sales, largely driven by an 8.3% increase in digital sales of individual tracks and 16.1% increase in 
digital album sales).   
 29. See Byrne, supra note 1; Nicole M. Richardson & Chandra M. Hayslett, The rise of independent 
music: indie labels maximize control, BLACK ENTERPRISE (Dec. 1, 2007), 
http://www.blackenterprise.com/2007/12/01/the-rise-of-independent-music/  (discussing the costs 
associated with producing and distributing a record and the record label’s need to recover those costs).  
 30. Byrne, supra note 2.  
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bels set a “break-even” point of minimum-records-sold, below which it 
was not economically feasible to distribute a record, because labels would 
not recover their investments.
31
  Thus, labels were forced to over-inflate 
the retail price of a CD and limit artists to those royalties available after the 
label recovered its cost from production and distribution of the record.
32
 
For example, depending on the specific structure of the artist contract 
in question, a traditional royalty payment for a CD that costs $15.99, may 
break down like this: 




Conversely, a breakdown of the payments associated with a CD sold as 
an MP3, which only costs $9.99, may break down like this: 





 31. Id. 
 32. Ferreira et al., supra note 19. 
 33. Byrne, supra note 2. 
File: McCubbin Article Created on: 12/4/2012 8:27:00 PM Last Printed: 12/11/2012 2:41:00 AM 
2012 THE AFTERMATH OF AFTERMATH 329 
As the charts above demonstrate, the profits from “record” sales are 
lower in the Digital Age because of the lower costs required to get those 
“records” to consumers with digital technology.35  With digital distribution, 
it costs less to manufacture an MP3 “record” than it did when CDs domi-
nated the industry.  Thus, labels charge consumers less because they have 
lower costs to recover.  However, when consumers are charged less per 
“record” in the Digital Age, labels earn less profit per unit, making artists’ 
royalty percentages lower per sale.  While labels and artists are earning 
less from “record” sales in the Digital Age, artists are finding new ways to 
earn revenues in this digital era.
36
 
In this Digital Age, recording costs have decreased significantly as art-
ists are able to record and mix music from home and no longer rely on 
major label funding to pay for professional recording studios, engineers, 
and producers.
37
  The cost of manufacturing, printing, and shipping CDs, 
which labels bore in the traditional CD-based traditional industry model, 
has been largely eliminated in this Digital Age.  Today, artists can distrib-
ute their songs via the Internet, largely for free, and do not have to buckle 
to the volume pressures, which characterized the traditional industry.
38
  In 
the traditional industry, creating a successful artist could cost labels up-
wards of $1 million after promotion, research and development, and pro-
duction costs are factored in.
39
  Additionally, labels currently invest ap-
proximately $5 billion a year in artists worldwide.
40
  By contrast, produc-
tion and distribution in MP3 format costs only a few hundred to a few 
thousand dollars, depending on the equipment used.
41
  Further, artists can 
distribute their music through free channels, like YouTube and Facebook, 
building a fan base without relying on major label funding. 
Additionally, the Digital Age has presented artists with opportunities 
to secure revenue via channels that previously never existed.
42
  For exam-
ple, under the “traditional” model artists earned money from selling CDs, 
  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Casey, Breaking Artists, and New Definitions of Success, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, (Jan. 
29, 2010), http://futureofmusic.org/blog/2010/01/29/breaking-artists-and-new-definitions-success.   
 37. Byrne, supra note 2; see, e.g., Richardson, supra note 29 (indicating costs for professional 
recordings range from $10 thousand to $100 thousand per musical track and renting a recording studio 
can cost $1 thousand a day).  
 38. Richardson, supra note 29, at 3.  
 39. Helienne Lindval, The record industry fights its corner in the download age, Music Blog, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Mar. 12, 2010, 12:07 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/musicblog 
/2010/mar/12/ behind-the-music-record-industry-ifpi-report.  
 40. Id. 
 41. See James Lee Stanley, How Much Does It Cost to Make A Record?, DATAMUSICATA (Nov. 28, 
2007, 10:19 AM), http://www.datamusicata.com/journal/2007/11/28/how-much-does-it-cost-to-make-
a-record.html. 
 42. Casey, supra note 36. 
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live touring, and “public performances” via radio and licensing; however, 
as new mediums, like video games, ringtones, and streaming music over 
the Internet continue to develop, artists have more opportunities to spread 
their work and grow revenues.
43
  Further, artists have traditionally earned 
higher royalty percentages through live performances, rather than album 
sales.  Thus, with lower distribution and publicity costs in the Digital Age, 
artists can spend their resources on touring and increase their revenues 
through live performance, despite a decline in hard-copy sales.
44
  
From the rise of radio, to different technologies competing to become 
the preferred means of listening to music among consumers, record labels 
have faced pressure from various sources, in varying degrees, throughout 
the evolution of music.
45
  However, the music business has, arguably, ex-
perienced no greater threat than the development of the MP3, which allows 
an audio file to be compressed to about one tenth of its original size, mak-
ing it easier and cheaper to distribute music than ever before.
46
  
With CD-based distribution, artists relied on labels to front the costs 
associated with producing and distributing their music.  Thus, labels stood 
to make the most profit in the CD-dominated, traditional industry model 
because artists were forced to rely on their well-funded, established distri-
bution channels.
47
  Further, with CD-based distribution, consumers had to 
purchase an entire record, even if they only preferred one or two songs on 
that record.  By contrast, the Digital Age allows consumers to pay consid-
erably less by purchasing their favorite songs individually.
48
  Thus, as indi-
vidual-track-purchasing is increasing in the Digital Age, record labels are 
seeing less profit from records sold.
49
  Given this, it is no surprise that CD 
costs have decreased, as labels strive to keep the CD viable among con-




 43. See Do music artists fare better in a world with illegal file-sharing, TIMES LABS BLOG, (Nov. 
12, 2009), http://labs.timesonline.co.uk/blog/2009/11/12/do-music-artists-do-better-in-a-world-with-
illegal-file-sharing/.  
 44. Id.  
 45. As new methods for listening to music were introduced to the marketplace, consumer purchases 
were temporarily diverted, leading to decreased sales for major labels.  For example, as radio grew in 
popularity during the 1920s, vinyl record sales decreased.  Similarly, as the marketplace was confront-
ed with new mediums (i.e. vinyl to cassette, cassette to CD), older mediums, and overall sales, suffered 
as consumers transitioned to the new playing devices required by those mediums.  Ghosemajumder et. 
al, supra note 2, at 1–3.   
 46. Ghosemajumder et. al, supra note 2, at 3. 
 47. See Byrne, supra note 2; Ferreira, et al., supra note 19. 
 48. See Michael DeGusta, The REAL Death Of The Music Industry, SAI Contributors, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Feb. 18, 2011, 12:13 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-charts-explain-the-real-
death-of-the-music-industry-2011-2.  
 49. Id.  
 50. The Recording Industry Association of America, The CD: A Better Value Than Ever, (Aug. 
2007) www.riaa.com. See generally Byrne, supra note 2; Ferreira, et al., supra note 19. 
File: McCubbin Article Created on: 12/4/2012 8:27:00 PM Last Printed: 12/11/2012 2:41:00 AM 
2012 THE AFTERMATH OF AFTERMATH 331 
Digital distribution has significantly diminished artists’ reliance on 
major label distribution.  In the traditional system, where CDs dominated, 
artists only earned, on average, less than one dollar for every sixteen-dollar 
CD sold.
51
  While artists were forced to rely on labels when CDs dominat-
ed the market; the shift to digital music distribution has diminished that 
need.
52
  Thus, as in the past, where technological changes have forced the 
industry to change its business model, the shift to digital distribution will 
have a similar impact as costs are lower and genres continue to fragment.  
In the digital era, the traditional-industry-justifications for lower artist roy-
alties no longer hold true because labels no longer need to recover the high 
distribution costs associated with the CD-based model.     
As digital distribution continues to grow, the Aftermath decision and 
ever-changing technology demonstrate the recording industry’s need to 
adapt and restructure to stay viable.  The Digital Age for music is here, and 
labels must look to alternative business models to remain influential play-
ers in this developing, new industry. 
III. ANALYSIS: F.B.T. PRODUCTIONS V. AFTERMATH RECORDS  
In a new era for music, where digital sales are the preferred medium 
among consumers, record labels no longer need to, nor can they realistical-
ly, rely on physical album sales to generate revenues.
53
  Digital technology 
has lowered costs for production and distribution of music, allowing artists 
to operate independently of major label support.  Even if artists still sign to 
a label, digital distribution has eliminated the costs associated with manu-
facturing a physical CD, meaning lower overhead for labels to incur.
54
   
The standard recording contract awards an artist a “royalty” based on a 
fixed percentage rate of total revenues earned from sales of that artist’s 
work.  As discussed above, royalties developed to ensure that labels would 
recover the costs necessary to promote, manufacture, and distribute an art-
ist’s work.  Depending on the type of recording contract, artists typically 
earn anywhere from six percent to eighteen percent, with labels earning 
between fifty percent and sixty percent, of the revenues from records 
  
 51. Ferreira et al., supra note 19.  
 52. Byrne, supra note 2.   
 53. See Digital sales gains over physical in 2011, supra note 23 (reporting significantly decreased 
physical album sales and, thus, generating the industry’s need to rely on digital distribution mecha-
nisms to remain profitable).  
 54. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 2 (showing how decreased market-entry costs, resulting from digital 
distribution systems, allow independent artists and labels to operate more efficiently by bypassing the 
costs associated with physical CD distribution); The music industry–From major to minor, supra note 1 
(discussing similar cost decreases for major labels as a result of digital distribution systems).   
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sold.
55
  As F.B.T. Productions v. Aftermath Records demonstrates, artists 
typically receive a higher royalty percentage for records licensed than they 
do from records sold. 
In light of the decreased costs from digital distributions, major labels 
no longer need to recoup the expenses associated with physical album sales 
and can, therefore, offer higher royalties for artists.  Further, as the discus-
sion below shows, music distribution in the Digital Age seems to be shift-
ing from selling music to licensing it as consumers receive their music 
differently than they did during the traditional industry era.  This shift will 
trigger the higher royalty percentage rate for artist in most recording con-
tracts.  If labels hope to remain a practical option in the Digital Age, they 
need to reevaluate the royalty percentages they offer artists or risk an in-
creasing number of musicians opting for independent distribution and 
foregoing the label structure entirely.  
The principle contention in F.B.T. Productions v. Aftermath Records 
was whether the defendant-record-label, Aftermath Records, was selling or 
licensing the musical works of rap artist Eminem.  Specifically, the court 
examined whether Aftermath’s relationship with digital distribution ser-
vices, like Apple’s iTunes system, constituted a seller-buyer relationship, 
or a licensor-licensee relationship.
56
  The dispute centered on the percent-
age amount of royalties owed to F.B.T. under its contract with Aftermath, 
stemming from the distribution of Eminem’s recordings.57  The parties 
disagreed on whether the contract’s “Records Sold” provision or “Masters 
Licensed” provision determined the royalty rate for distribution of 
Eminem’s recordings in the form of permanent downloads.58  At the trial 
court, after denying F.B.T.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the jury re-
turned a verdict for Aftermath; however, the Ninth Circuit reversed, find-
ing that the contract’s “Masters Licensed” provision unambiguously ap-





 55. See EDWARD R. HEARN, Recording and Distribution Contracts with Independent Labels 1, 5 
(2001) (discussing various royalty percentages for multiple types of recording contracts).  
 56. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 961 (Note: the case involves multiple parties; however, the court 
referred to them as F.B.T. Productions and Aftermath Records, respectively.  Accordingly, this analysis 
will do the same).   
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
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A. Background of the Dispute 
In 1995, Eminem signed an exclusive recording contract with F.B.T, 
giving it the exclusive rights to his music.
60
  Thereafter, in 1998, F.B.T 
entered an agreement with a larger label, Aftermath, transferring Eminem’s 
exclusive recordings to the defendant, Aftermath.
61
  Under that agree-
ment’s “Records Sold” provision, F.B.T. is owed “between 12% and 20% 
of the adjusted retail price of all ‘full price records sold in the United States 
. . . through normal retail channels.’”62  Alternatively, if Aftermath licenses 
an Eminem recording, the “Masters Licensed” provision is triggered.  That 
provision specifies that “‘[n]otwithstanding the foregoing,’ F.B.T. is to 
receive 50% of Aftermath’s net receipts ‘[o]n masters licensed by [After-
math] . . . to others for their manufacture and sale of records or for any 
other uses.’”63   
The contract further provides that a “master” is a “‘recording of sound 
. . . which is used or useful in the recording, production or manufacture of 
records.’”64  However, as the terms “licensed” and “normal retail channels” 
are not defined by the contract, the dispute centered on which of these pro-




In 2002, Aftermath entered an agreement with Apple Computer, Inc. 
that allowed Eminem’s master recordings to be sold through Apple’s 
iTunes store as permanent downloads.
66
  Under the agreement, 
“[p]ermanent downloads are digital copies of recordings that, once down-
loaded over the Internet, remain on an end-user’s computer or other device 
until deleted.”67  Since 2001, Aftermath had entered into many contracts, 
like its agreement with Apple, for third-party distributors, including major 
cell phone networks, to sell Eminem’s recordings.68   
Recording contracts, like that between F.B.T. and Aftermath, often 
provide for increased royalty percentages based on “escalations.”69  An 
“escalation” grants higher royalties when “total album sales surpass certain 
targets.”70  In 2004, F.B.T. and Aftermath amended their contract to in-
  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 961. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 961–62. 
 65. See id. at 961–62, 964–65 (relying on various sections of the Copyright Act and relevant case 
law to define the term “license” under the agreement in dispute).  
 66. Id. at 962. 
 67. Id.  
 68. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 962. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
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clude that “‘Sales of Albums by way of permanent download shall be 
treated as [U.S. Normal Retail Channel] Net Sales for the purposes of esca-
lations.’”71  The 2004 amendment indicates that “‘[e]xcept as specifically 
modified herein, the Agreement shall be unaffected and remain in full 
force and effect.’”72  Thus, aside from amending the contract to allow per-
manent downloads to factor into the escalation calculation, the original 
agreement, “Records Sold” provision, and “Masters Licensed” provision 
remained unchanged.
73
   
When a 2006 audit revealed that Aftermath had been using the “Rec-
ords Sold” provision to calculate F.B.T.’s royalties for the sale of 
Eminem’s music through digital downloads, F.B.T. brought suit.74  F.B.T. 
asserted that distributing Eminem’s recordings through digital download 
constituted a licensing of that recording, thus seeking to have the “Masters 
Licensed” provision, and the accompanying fifty percent royalty distribu-
tion, apply to digital downloads of Eminem’s music.75  Conversely, After-
math argued that such downloads were sales of Eminem’s work and, thus, 
only owed F.B.T. between twelve percent and twenty percent royalties 
under the “Recordings Sold” provision.76  After denying both parties’ mo-




B. The Ninth Circuit Decision 
The central focus of the dispute was whether Aftermath licensed 
Eminem’s music to third party download providers, like Apple, triggering 
the “Masters Licensed” provision, rather than the “Records Sold” provi-
sion.
78
  Aside from arguing that F.B.T. waived its ability to appeal the trial 
court’s decision, based on procedural failures that are beyond the scope of 
this note, the thrust of Aftermath’s argument was that the “Records Sold” 
provision applied to downloads of Eminem’s music.79  In its motion for 
summary judgment, Aftermath maintained that because permanent down-
loads are “records” and digital music providers, like iTunes, are normal 
retail channels, the “Records Sold” provision should apply to such down-
  
 71. Id. (emphasis added).  
 72. Id.  
 73. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 962. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
 78. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 962. 
 79. Id. at 962–63.  
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loads.
80
  In rejecting this argument, however, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
the agreement also provided that “notwithstanding” the “Records Sold” 
provision, F.B.T. is to receive a fifty percent royalty rate on “‘masters li-
censed by [Aftermath] . . . to others.’”81  The court concluded that, in light 
of the term “notwithstanding,” if an Eminem master is licensed, F.B.T. 
would receive a fifty percent royalty, “even if a transaction arguably falls 
within the scope of the Records Sold provision.”82    
The court begins by defining “license” as “permission to act,” accord-
ing to the ordinary definition of the word.
83
  Further, it reasoned that where 
Aftermath, by its own admission, entered into agreements that merely per-
mitted third parties to use Eminem’s masters to sell permanent downloads, 
such permissive uses were licenses.
84
 
However, beyond the basic understanding of the word “license,” the 
court further supported its conclusion that Aftermath’s relationship with 
third party distributors was that of licensor-licensee by applying federal 
copyright law.  The court first noted the clearly differentiated meanings 
given to the terms “license” and “sale” under the Copyright Act, highlight-
ing important policy differences distinguishing the two terms, which 
should govern artists’ rights.85  Under federal copyright law, the first sale 
doctrine grants the lawful owner of a particular copy the power to “sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy” without the permission of 
the copyright owner.
86
  Here, that “copy” would refer to a consumer’s pur-
chase of an individual CD, separating physical property from intellectual 
property.  By distinguishing between ownership of the copyright and own-
ership of a mere copy of the copyrighted expression, the doctrine strikes a 
balance between the purchaser’s right to make use of his property and the 
copyright holder’s interest in the underlying intellectual property therein.87 
Categorizing a transfer of copyright as a license versus a sale is im-
portant because a licensee is only permitted to make use of the work under 
the circumstances specified by the license, while a buyer can take certain 
actions without express permission.
88
  While the first sale doctrine is ex-
  
 80. Id. at 964.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
1304 (2002)).  
 84. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 964–65. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008).  
 87. Eurie Hayes Smith IV, Digital First Sale: Friend or Foe?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 853, 
854 (2005).  
 88. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:41 
(4th ed. 2001) (noting that, beyond the power to sell or dispose of a particular copy, a buyer can do 
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pressly broad in that it exhausts a copyright holder’s ability to control a 
particular copy, intellectual property interests compel limiting a buyer’s 
rights by restricting the doctrine’s reach to commercial transactions.89  In 
other words, a buyer’s property interest in a particular copy is largely out-
weighed by the copyright owner’s interest in the broader right to control 
the work, thus requiring a buyer to obtain a copyright owner’s permission 
to engage in uses other than resale.  By expressly limiting a buyer’s power 
to making second-hand distributions, the first sale doctrine implicitly en-
sures that the copyright holder retains all other rights granted under the 
Copyright Act.
90
  Thus, the first sale doctrine only relates to particular cop-
ies of a work, leaving the copyright holder to prescribe to others any addi-
tional uses of its work in the form of a license.
91
 
In contrast to a sale, a license is an agreement between the copyright 
holder and a licensee, allowing the licensee to make certain, specified uses 
of the copyright holder’s work.92  Various provisions of the Copyright Act 
define “license.”  First, § 114(f) of the Copyright Act refers to various uses 
and authorizations a copyright owner may grant to third parties, such as: 
allowing subscription services to transmit his sound recordings and make 
public performances, referring to such permissive uses as “licenses.”93  
Further, the court notes that the rights permitted by licenses, unless ex-
pressly granted to a third party, are those ordinarily held exclusively by the 
copyright owner.
94
   
Additionally, federal copyright law allows third parties to obtain a 
“compulsory license” to produce and distribute “phonorecords” of musical 
works, namely songs, to consumers for private use, provided that such dis-
tribution is with the authority of the copyright owner.
95
  The ability to ob-
tain a compulsory license is, however, restricted by the uses a licensee may 
make of the copyrighted work.
96
  Implicit in this statutory requirement that 
compulsory licenses can only be obtained with the express authorization of 
the copyright holder is the notion that the copyright holder retains all own-
  
little without the permission of the copyright holder who otherwise has exclusive rights and control 
over the intellectual property).  
 89. See Quality King Distribs. v. L’anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998) (discussing ex-
haustion of a copyright holder’s interests merely as related to distribution of a particular copy of a work 
after placing the work in the stream of commerce, giving the buyer the right to make future, second-
hand sales).  
 90. Id.  
 91. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965. 
 92. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2012).  
 93. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2012); F.B.T. Prods., 612 F.3d at 965. 
 94. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965. 
 95. 2 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6:120 (2d ed. 2012).  
 96. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2010) (restricting permissible uses of compulsory licenses to “dis-
tribute [phonorecords] to the public for private use”).  
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ership rights of the underlying material and merely permits third parties to 
distribute it.
97
  Thus, licensor-copyright-owners retain any rights not grant-
ed to the licensee in the license and any licensee rights are merely permit-
ted by the copyright owner.   
The court concluded that a transaction is a license where the copyright 
holder transfers a copy of its material to a third party, yet retains title to the 
work, limits the permissible uses of the material, and is periodically com-
pensated based on the licensee’s use of the material.98  Where a copyright 
owner transfers copies of its work to a third party to make certain specified 
uses, and those uses are expressly limited by the language of the transfer 
agreement, such permissive uses constitute a license because the transferee 
holds no copyright interest in the underlying work.
99
  When a copyright 
owner imposes restrictions on how a third party may redistribute or trans-
fer a particular copy of its work, the purchaser of that right is a licensee, 
not an owner, because an owner has greater alienability with respect to its 
property than that afforded by a license.
100
  To truly own something con-
notes the ability to make any possible use of it.  As illustrated above, an 
owner of a copy may resell that copy based on the owner’s property inter-
est in the tangible good; however, where an owner of a copy simply main-
tains a property interest in the physical good, any uses beyond reselling are 
controlled by the licensor-copyright-holder, which retains all other rights in 
the work.  The licensor chooses the rights and uses a licensee is permitted 
to make.   
The parties did not dispute that Aftermath was the copyright holder of 
Eminem’s recordings after it obtained those rights from F.B.T. in exchange 
for the royalty rates in contention.
101
  However, Aftermath’s agreements 
with third party distributors, like Apple, do not constitute a “sale” because 
those third parties did not receive title to the digital works.
102
  At all times, 
Aftermath retained title and ownership of the digital files, reserving the 
right to remove the files from Apple, preventing it from distributing the 
files to consumers, and obtained recurring payments based on download 
volume via the third party distributors.
103
  Because Aftermath retained title 
  
 97. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965 (noting that, despite the authorization to distribute phonorecords, 
the title to the underlying work remains with the copyright holder).  
 98. Id.  
 99. Wall Data, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 784–85 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(discussing licenses under 17 U.S.C. § 117 as relates to authorized use of computer software).  
 100. Id. at 785 (characterizing restraints imposed by the copyright owner on the purchaser’s rights 
under the agreement to denote a license because copyright owners would enjoy greater freedoms in 
their property). 
 101. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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to the copyright at all times, its agreements with third parties comported 
well with the statutory definition of a license: distribution of permanent 
downloads, in exchange for periodic payments, authorized by the copyright 
holder.
104
  Third party distributors never owned Eminem’s work.  Rather, 
Aftermath permitted download providers to make specified uses of copies 
of Eminem’s work, at all times owning and controlling the underlying 
works.    
Further, as § 115 of the Copyright Act expressly recognizes distribu-
tion of digital downloads by third-party vendors as a “license,” and the 
contract does not indicate a different definition, Aftermath’s relationship 
with those third parties is that of licensor-licensee.
105
 
Despite Aftermath’s contention that the “Masters Licensed” provision 
had, previously, been applied “‘only to compilation records and incorpora-
tion into movies, TV shows, and commercials,’” its agreement with F.B.T. 
does not indicate that it intended to restrict the term “license” to such 
use.
106
  Where digital downloads only came to exist between 2001 and 
2003, and the contract expressly recognizes Aftermath’s right to exploit 
Eminem’s masters in any future technology, the terms of the contract, spe-
cifically “license,” were intended to evolve with technology.107  Thus, the 
court concluded that the trial court erred by denying F.B.T.’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment as Aftermath merely permitted third parties to use 
Eminem’s masters to sell digital downloads, and reversed the trial court’s 
judgment in favor of Aftermath.
108
  The court remanded the issue for fur-
ther proceedings.
109
  As Aftermath’s relationship with third-party distribu-
tors constitutes a license, F.B.T. is owed fifty percent royalties of After-
math’s profits from those downloads.110 
C.  The Allman Brothers Case 
In 2008, a district court in the Southern District of New York decided 
an issue similar to the dispute in Aftermath; however, given its lack of legal 
analysis, the ruling in Allman will not impact future applications of the 
principles in Aftermath.
111
  In both Aftermath and Allman, the court ana-
lyzed a record label’s relationship with third-party download providers and 
  
 104. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2012); F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965. 
 105. Id. 
 106. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 966. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 967. 
 109. Id.  
 110. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 967.  
 111. Allman v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, No. 06 CV 3252(GBD), 2008 WL 2477465, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008).  
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whether, in light of that relationship, higher royalty percentages were due 
to artists.
112
  However, Aftermath marks the first time such an issue has 
been discussed at the appellate level and, because Allman was decided on a 
procedural issue, Aftermath more accurately represents the current state of 
the industry.  Thus, the holding in Allman will probably not undermine the 
decision in Aftermath.  However, the facts in Allman, specifically the con-
tractual language at issue, support the conclusion in Aftermath and should 
serve to reinforce its basic premise: record labels and third party download 
providers have a licensor-licensee relationship.    
As in Aftermath, the dispute in Allman centered on the royalty percent-
age owed to plaintiff-songwriters from their defendant-label.  The issue 
was whether plaintiffs were owed fifty percent royalties of the defendant’s 
net licensing proceeds.
113
  Plaintiffs sought fifty percent royalties from the 
revenue earned through sales of plaintiffs’ recordings by the defendant-
label’s licensees, third-party digital download providers.114  In an un-
published opinion, the court granted defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, find-
ing that the contractual language, upon which plaintiffs’ claim was prem-
ised, did not justify the proposed royalty rate.
115
  This case, however, is 
distinguishable from Aftermath in that the court did not conduct sufficient 
analysis of plaintiffs’ claim, dismissing the complaint for plaintiffs’ inade-
quate pleading and ruling based on a purely procedural issue.
116
 
In Allman, the contract’s licensing provision provided that “‘[i]n re-
spect of any Master Recording leased by [defendant] to others for their 
distribution of Phonograph Records in the United States, [defendant] will 
pay [plaintiff] fifty percent (50%) of [defendant’s] net receipts from its 
Licensee.’”117  The court concluded that, based on the plaintiffs’ failure to 
demonstrate that the defendant had leased its masters to third-party distrib-
utors, the fifty percent royalty rate was inapplicable based on the provi-
sion’s language.118  The plaintiffs’ failure to allege specific facts showing 
that their record label “leased” their music constituted an insufficient 
pleading and the court granted defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.119   
However, aside from the plaintiffs’ failure to properly assert their 
claim, the express language of their recording contract does not require a 
different result than that reached in Aftermath, that record label relation-
  
 112. Id. at *2. 
 113. Id. at *1. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at *2. 
 116. Id. (granting defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), for plaintiffs’ 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted).  
 117. Allman, 2008 WL 2477465, at *1 (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at *2.  
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ships with digital download providers are that of licensor-licensee.
120
  To 
the contrary, the contractual language in Allman expressly deems a third-
party distributor a “licensee,” and, were it not for plaintiffs’ inadequate 
complaint, the proper result would have been reached.
121
 
D.  Aftermath and the Current State of the Industry 
By properly applying relevant copyright and case law rules, the Ninth 
Circuit reached the correct conclusion in Aftermath, that third-party dis-
tributors are licensees.  As licensees, artists deserve higher royalty percent-
ages based on the downloads they provide, rather than the lower percent-
ages earned from sales.  On March 21, 2011, the Supreme Court of the 
United States denied Aftermath’s petition for a writ of certiorari, accepting 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision and cementing the pro-artist shift currently 
underway in the new, increasingly-digital age of music.
122
  Moreover, the 
Ninth Circuit decision, and subsequent denial of Aftermath’s petition, 
comports well with the trend toward digital distribution in the music indus-
try discussed below.   
Digital distribution has decreased the costs associated with producing 
and distributing music.  Where, under the traditional, CD-based music in-
dustry, record labels had to withhold payments to artists until they could 
first recoup expenses, the shift to digital distribution systems, like those 
examined in Aftermath, has largely decreased these costs.
123
  Traditionally, 
labels bore the expense of recording costs because they were simply too 
high for artists to handle without support.
124
  For example, recording costs 
included a minimum of fifteen thousand dollars to rent a professional stu-
dio, plus the cost of an engineer and producer, which could cost up to $100 
thousand per track.
125
  However, in the digital age, artists no longer rely on 
labels to front these costs because records can be made from in-home “stu-
dios” using laptop computers.126 
As discussed above, today’s music consumer purchases music digitally 
through third-party digital download providers, like those contemplated in 
Aftermath.  Whereas, in the past, record labels rarely licensed music to 
third parties, the Aftermath decision makes it clear that licensing is now the 
  
 120. See F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965–66. 
 121. Allman, 2008 WL 2477465, at *1.  
 122. Aftermath Records, Inc. v. F.B.T. Prods., LLC, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. 
filed, (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 10-768) available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-768.htm.  
 123. Byrne, supra note 2.  
 124. Id. 
 125. See id.; Richardson, supra note 29 (citing costs associated with recording records).  
 126. Byrne, supra note 2.  
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common distribution method for labels.
127
  Consumers rely on digital 
download providers, like Apple, as the sources for their digital music con-
sumption.  Thus, labels rely on licensing their music catalogues to down-
load providers for distribution to consumers.  In light of Aftermath, labels 
will now need to pay the once-rare fifty percent licensing-royalty rate on a 
regular basis as they distribute artists’ music through digital download.  
Thus, labels will be paying artists more and earning less if they do not re-
structure their business model to secure revenue differently than they did in 
the traditional industry. 
Today, artists are able to grow their reputations digitally, without radio 
airplay or marked retail sales, and earn money from merchandising, licens-
ing songs to video games, commercials, TV shows, ringtones, and through 
performance royalties from webcasting and satellite radio.
128
  Consequent-
ly, artists are becoming more self-reliant and leaving major labels to exist 
independently, affording themselves complete creative control over their 
works and the resulting economic dividends.
129
  Labels must restructure 
their approach to the industry if they hope to remain a successful enter-
prise. 
IV. APPLICATION   
In Aftermath, the Ninth Circuit properly concluded that Aftermath’s re-
lationship with third party download distributors, like Apple’s iTunes, con-
stituted a licensor-licensee, rather than seller-buyer, agreement.
130
  In light 
of this holding, and the shift to digital distribution of music in the coming 
era, record labels will need to reevaluate the royalty percentages they offer 
artists if they hope to stay viable in an era when many musicians are oper-
ating independently of label support.   
As discussed above, given the decreased costs associated with music 
distribution in the digital era, the traditional justifications for withholding 
payments from artists, and only paying them small royalties, no longer 
exist.  Essentially, with lower distribution costs, labels are no longer taking 
as large a risk by investing in an artist because they do not need to invest as 
much.  Further, more artists are opting to pursue their careers without sign-
ing to a major label; thus, labels will need to make themselves more attrac-
  
 127. See F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965–66. 
 128. See Byrne, supra note 2; Mike McCready, The Future of the Music Industry, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-mccready/the-future-of-the-music-
i_b_173481.html. 
 129. See Byrne, supra note 2; Richardson, supra note 29 (discussing various artists who have left 
their major label distributors to afford themselves greater freedom).  
 130. See supra Part III. A. 
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tive by offering higher royalties from music sales.  Labels have realized 
that the profits earned from digital music sales will, likely, never equal 
those gained from traditional CD distribution.
131
  Because consumers have 
indicated their continued interest in digital music, labels will need to rely 
less on retail sales and more on other profitable aspects of the industry, like 
merchandising, licensing, and touring, to remain viable.   
As digital becomes the dominant method for music consumption, there 
are several possible futures for the industry.  Based on the Aftermath hold-
ing, it is clear that if labels continue to move into the Digital Age using old 
business models, namely, licensing music to third-party platforms for dis-
tribution, it will be increasingly expensive for them to operate.
132
  Current-
ly, labels base their revenue on selling music to consumers, largely through 
third-party download providers.  Now, in light of Aftermath, that model 
will cost labels a fifty percent royalty rate for any music they license to 
third-party distributors.  This system will not be sustainable in the Digital 
Age as labels can no longer rely on the sale-based business model in an era 
characterized by music licensing.     
The industry has begun to confront this issue by restructuring artist 
contracts in several ways.  First, many major labels are turning to the “360 
Deal” in which all aspects of an artist’s career and works are owned and 
controlled by the label.
133
  This may be beneficial to the labels because 
they receive a portion of all profits earned by the artist; however, artists 
may not favor such deals because they lose some creative control and have 
to share almost every aspect of their career with the label.
134
   
A second option, the “Profit-Sharing Deal” allows the artist to retain 
the master to the recording but shares in the profits with the label.
135
  How-
ever, the trend in the industry is towards licensing arrangements, like those 
contemplated by Aftermath, because the industry has learned that consum-
ers demand music at no cost, or nearly free, and is moving away from 
iTunes-like paid downloads and towards free streaming of content.
136
  Es-
sentially, data indicates that today’s consumer is less interested in purchas-
ing music and, instead, seeks to listen to music online for free, without ever 
purchasing the song.
137
  Under this system, labels, or the copyright owners, 
will license the works to third-party distribution services that will offer the 
music for free to consumers.
138
  The service will either be funded by adver-
  
 131. The music industry, supra note 1.  
 132. See F.B.T. Prods., LLC, 621 F.3d at 962–63. 
 133. Byrne, supra note 2.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. 
 136. The music industry, supra note 1.  
 137. Id.  
 138. McCready, supra note 128. 
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tisers or through the end consumer’s monthly Internet subscription rate.139  
This system is similar to the arrangement at issue in Aftermath in that it 
contemplates a licensor-licensee relationship between the label and third 
party distributors.  Unlike Aftermath, however, the third-party distributors 
will not earn revenue based on paid downloads but, rather, will pay a fee to 
labels for use of the music and run the risk of securing revenue from vari-
ous other channels.
140
  In this system, artists are paid royalties based on the 
fee charged to third party distributors for use of their works.
141
  
From this free distribution model, another option for labels, which also 
comports well with the decision in Aftermath, is the “License Deal.”  Here, 
the artist retains the copyrights and ownership of the master recording, like 
Aftermath did, and licenses the right to exploit that property to a label, for 
a limited period of time.
142
  This arrangement allows both parties to profit 
from the works created, recover their investments, and will allow labels to 
profit by licensing songs to third party distributors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the digital era of music, major labels have two choices: adapt to the 
changing trends in consumer preferences and survive or continue to oper-
ate under the traditional model and fail.  As more artists pursue their ca-
reers independent of major label support, the possibility of failure grows.  
However, even in the digital age, major labels are still attractive for many 
traditional reasons, like advertising, promotion, and substantial bankrolls.  
In light of Aftermath, and the digital trend in music distribution, it will be 
up to labels to keep themselves an attractive option for artists.  The current 
label structure, which relies on profits from music sales, will not remain 
viable in a digital era where music is licensed to third-party distributors.  
By finding alternative ways to profit from “records” and offering artists 




 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Byrne, supra note 2. 
